Tax is higher than the standard economic model predicts.
If people weighed only the probability of against the penalty, would be far more common than it is.
Something other than is therefore doing most of the work.
Field experiments identify two mechanisms, and only one of them is reliable.
Letters telling taxpayers that most people in their area pay on time raise payment measurably.
The effect depends on the statement being true and on the recipient believing it plausible.
Where is genuinely low, the same letter cannot be sent, and the honest version would reduce payment.
The second mechanism is , and it is far more durable.
People pay when they believe that others pay and that the money buys something they can see.
Both halves are necessary, and the second is usually neglected by administrations that focus on enforcement.
Perceived fairness of the system matters more than the rate itself in most survey work.
A taxpayer who believes that large firms settle privately for a fraction of what is owed reasons accordingly about their own return.
Publicity about a single high-profile can therefore cost more revenue than it collects.
Administrative design carries as much weight as any moral appeal.
, where the authority sends a completed form for approval, raise and cut errors simultaneously.
They also remove the moment at which a taxpayer decides what to declare, which is precisely the point.
does the same work at a larger scale and explains most of the variation in between countries.
Income that an employer reports is declared almost perfectly; income that only the earner knows about is not.